



### FirmGuide: Boosting the Capability of Rehosting Embedded Linux Kernels through Model-Guided Kernel Execution

**Qiang Liu**<sup>1\*</sup> Cen Zhang<sup>2\*</sup> Lin Ma<sup>1</sup> Muhui Jiang<sup>1,3</sup> Yajin Zhou<sup>1</sup> Lei Wu<sup>1</sup> Wenbo Shen<sup>1</sup> Xiapu Luo<sup>3</sup> Yang Liu<sup>2</sup> Kui Ren<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Zhejiang University <sup>2</sup>Nanyang Technological University <sup>3</sup>The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

\*The first two authors contributed equally to this work.

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### Motivation



- Linux kernel with drivers inside high-end embedded firmware
- Understanding and testing abilities not easily and scalably due to hardware requirement
- Rehosting the embedded Linux kernel with the best effort

## Challenge and Observation 1

SoC: plxtech,nas782	X			
CPU	Arm11MPCore			
Memory	up to 512M			
Interrupt Controller	gic	High fidelity to make the Linux kernel functional-correct		
Time-related	rps, oscillator, sysclk, plla, pllb, stdclk, twdclk			
UART	ns16550a			
Others	gmacclk, pcie, watchdog, sata, nand, ethernet, ehci, leds	Low fidelity for successful boot		
High-fidelity Virtual Device				
• Numerous peripherals: Type-I High Fidelity Type-II Low Fidelity — Dummy Virtual Device				

• Classifying peripherals for a minimum best effort

## Challenge and Observation 2

Multiple models for interrupt controllers ralink-rt2880-intc qca,ar7240-intc marvell,orion-intc marvell,orion-bridge-intc arm,cortex-a9-gic

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- *Diverse models*: Linux subsystems that hide implementation details
- Extracting state machines from the Linux subsystems (Type-I)

## Challenge and Observation 3



- *Complex semantics*: Specific driver interface callbacks that embed complex semantics
- Extracting MMIO R/W sequences

## Core Technique: Model-guided Kernel Execution



• Peripheral model = the model template (a state machine) + the model parameters (MMIO R/W sequences as transition conditions)















# Model-guided Kernel Execution: Methodology



• We semi-automatically build the state machine of each peripheral: a general model template (manually) plus model parameters (automatically)

### System Design and Implementation



LLVM pass for preprocess KLEE for MMIO R/W Seq Python for glues

Python for main logic Template-render pattern

### Evaluation

#### RQ 1: What peripheral models can we generate?

#### Type I

Family of SoCs	Interrupt Controller	Timer	First Solution (Second)	Exists CSVF (y/n)	<b>Timer Semantics</b>
ramips/rt305x	ralink-rt2880-intc	not necessary	1	n	-
ath79/generic	qca,ar7240-intc	not necessary	5	n	-
kirkwood/generic	marvell,orion-intc marvell,orion-bridge-intc	marvell,orion-timer	2	У	y=~x
bcm53xx/generic	arm,cortex-a9-gic	arm,cortex-a9-global-timer arm,cortex-a9-twd-timer	2,207	У	y=x1<<32+x2
oxnas/generic	arm,arm11mp-gic	plxtech,nas782x-rps-timer	914	У	y=x

#### Type II: # of initial values/# of Type II peripherals

Family of SoCs	ramips/rt305x	ath79/generic	kirkwood/generic	bcm53xx/generic	oxnas/generic
count	1/10	2/15	3/26	2/4	2/9

### Evaluation

#### RQ 2: What embedded Linux kernels can we rehost?

Subtarget	Unpack	Kernel	User Space	Shell
ramips/rt3050	4784	4784	4743 (99.14%)	4345 (90.80%)
ath79/generic	541	541	444 (82.07%)	444 (82.07%)
bcm53xx/generic	388	388	388 (100.00%)	388 (100.00%)
kirkwood/generic	330	326	324 (99.39%)	244 (74.85%)
oxnas/generic	149	149	48^ (32.21%)	48^ (32.21 %)
Overall	6192	6188	5947 (96.11%)	5469 (88.38%)

Given 6K+ firmware crossing 10 vendors, 3 architectures, and 22 Linux kernel versions, FirmGuide can successfully rehost more than 96% of them.

^The successful rate to support oxnas/generic is low because it cannot recognize our ramfs due to a unset flag.

### Evaluation

#### RQ 3: What about the functionality of the rehosted embedded Linux kernels?

#### Linux Test Project: Syscall Testing

Models	Pass	Skipped	Failed	Total
Fully Generated	1049	164	46	1259
Ground Truth	1049	164	46	1259

#### RQ 4: What are application of FirmGuide? CVE Reproduction and Exploit Development

CVE ID	CVE Type	Triggering	Exploitation
CVE-2016-5195	Race Condition	Ν	Ν
CVE-2016-8655	Race Condition	Yes	Y
CVE-2016-9793	Integer Overflow	Y	N
CVE-2017-7038	Integer Overflow	Y	Y
CVD-2017-1000112	Buffer Overflow	Y	Y
CVE-2018-5333	NULL Pointer Dereference	Y	Y

Fuzzing

run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 5 m	nin, 24 sec overall results	
last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 m last unig crash : none seen yet last unig hang : none seen yet	uin, 25 sec total paths : 15 uniq crashes : 0 uniq hangs : 0	
- cycle progress now processing : 14.0 (93.3%) paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)	map coverage map density : 0.02% / 0.02% count coverage : 1.00 bits/tuple finding inducts	
now trying : havoc stage execs : 8118/16.4k (49.55%) total execs : 159k	favored paths : 4 (26.67%) new edges on : 5 (33.33%) total crashes : 0 (0 unique)	
exec speed : 491.8/sec - fuzzing strategy yields	total tmouts : 0 (0 unique) path geometry	
bit flips : 0/32, 0/31, 0/29 byte flips : 0/4, 0/3, 0/1 arithmetics : 0/224, 0/0, 0/0	pending : 1 pend fav : 1	
known ints : 0/26, 0/84, 0/44 dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 0/2 havoc/rad : 1/65.5k, 0/85.2k, 0/0	own finds : 1 imported : 0 stability : 100.00%	
py/custom : 0/0, 0/0 trim : 78.72%/19, 0.00%	[cpu002: 15%]	

UnicoreFuzz

american fuzzy lop 2.06b (triforcafl	.)	
lq process timing qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq	overall resu	ilts qqqqqk
x run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 6 min, 7 sec x	cycles done	:0 x
x last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 30 sec x	total paths	: 413 x
x last uniq crash : none seen yet x	uniq crashes	:0 x
x last uniq hang : 0 days, 0 hrs, 1 min, 0 sec x	unig hangs	:6 x
tq cycle progress qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq	qqqqqqqqqqqqqqq	addadadada
x now processing : 0 (0.00%) x map density :	14.8k (0.70%)	X
x paths timed out : 0 (0.00%) x count coverage :	1.31 bits/tup	ole x
tq stage progress qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqt findings in dept	h qqqqqqqqqqqq	rddddddddd
x now trying : havoc x favored paths : 2	98 (72.15%)	x
x stage execs : 7715/32.0k (24.11%) x new edges on : 3	50 (84.75%)	x
x total execs : 12.5k x total crashes : 0	(0 unique)	x
x exec speed : 47.71/sec (slow!) x total hangs : 1	0 (6 unique)	x
to fuzzing strategy yields agggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggg	path geometry	aaaaaaaaa
x bit flips : 6/32, 3/31, 2/29 x	levels : 2	x
x byte flips : 0/4, 0/3, 0/1 x	pending : 41	L3 X
x arithmetics : 10/224, 0/204, 0/68 x	pend fav : 25	98 x
x known ints : 1/8, 0/18, 0/10 x o	wn finds : 60	) x
x dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0 x	imported : 0	×
x havoc : 0/0, 0/0 x	variable : 0	x
x trim: 92.86%/13, 0.00% tag	aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa	aaaaaaaaai
maaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa	[	pu: 14%]

TriforceAFL



Conclusion

A novel technique "Model-Guided Kernel Execution" for peripheral modeling

The first semi-automatic framework for embedded Linux kernel rehosting

Feasible dynamically understanding and mining vulnerability in embedded kernels

#### Discussion

Limitation and future work

Manual state machine construction for more complex peripherals

High fidelity of Type-II peripherals

#### Q & A

qiangliu@zju.edu.cn, cen001@e.ntu.edu.sg